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Abstract
Offshore outsourcing of administrative and technical services has become a mainstream 
business practice. Increasing commoditization of business services and growing client 
experience with outsourcing have created a range of competitive service delivery options for 
client firms. Yet, data from the Offshoring Research Network (ORN) suggests that, despite 
increasing market options and growing client quality and cost efficiency expectations, clients 
typically renew provider contracts and develop longer-term relationships with providers. 
Based on ORN data, this paper explores drivers of this phenomenon. The findings suggest 
that providers promote contract renewal by making client specific investments in software, IT 
infrastructure and training, and by involving clients in outsourcing operations, thereby 
increasing relation specific joint equity and creating opportunities for client monitoring and 
control. Interestingly, these strategies apply to routine rather than knowledge-intensive tasks, 
and are more likely to be applied by large rather than small providers. Surprisingly, high 
degree of contract specification makes contract renewal less likely. The paper contributes to 
the growing literature on strategic outsourcing of business services and the importance of 
governance mechanisms addressing ‘hidden costs’ as well as ‘hidden benefits’ of offshore 
outsourcing relationships. 
Keywords: Offshore Outsourcing, Strategic Outsourcing, Agency Theory, Service 
Contracting, Hidden Costs, Governance Mechanisms
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Introduction
Offshore outsourcing of administrative and technical tasks has become a mainstream business 
practice (e.g. Doh 2005; Bunyaratavej et al. 2010). Offshore outsourcing means that client 
companies choose to source functions and processes supporting domestic and global 
operations from outside their home countries, using third-party service providers. Research 
shows that cost savings are a primary initial reason for companies to outsource business 
functions in general (e.g. Murray and Kotabe 1999; Walker and Weber 1984), and to 
outsource offshore in particular (Farrell 2005; Levy 2005; Lewin and Couto 2007; Lewin and
Peeters 2006). In recent years, however, as companies learn the reality that “labor arbitrage” 
is a short term benefit they increasingly outsource offshore for more strategic reasons, such as 
to increase organizational flexibility, and to access talent and specialized capabilities (Lewin 
et al. 2009a; Manning et al. 2008; Kenney et al. 2009). In other words, firms do not only try 
to cut costs, but also create value through global outsourcing – a phenomenon some refer to 
as strategic outsourcing (e.g. Holcomb and Hitt 2007; Quinn 1999).  
Reflecting this increasing demand, global outsourcing has expanded rapidly in recent 
years, offering client firms the opportunity to select from a range of full-service and 
specialized providers for specific needs (e.g. Couto et al. 2008). As outsourcing services, 
such as administrative services (IT, finance and accounting, and human resources), as well as 
more knowledge-intensive services (product design, engineering, analytical services) have 
become increasingly commoditized, the global business services market has expanded rapidly 
and become more competitive in recent years. Client companies, in turn, have become more 
experienced in selecting vendors, assessing service quality and generating cost savings. 
Surprisingly, despite increasing cost and quality expectations of clients and the growing 
4availability of alternative providers (Lewin and Couto 2007), recent data collected by the 
Offshoring Research Network (ORN) shows that client firms rarely switch providers. This is 
even more surprising as clients become increasingly aware of potential service quality flaws 
and other ‘hidden costs’ (e.g. Dibbern et al. 2008) – likewise, service providers report 
meeting clients’ as key challenges (Couto et al. 2008, Lewin et al 2009b). Yet, we observe 
that service provider contracts are often renewed. In this study, we seek to better understand 
what drives the durability of offshore-outsourcing relationships.
Prior literature gives multiple reasons for why supplier relationships tend to last. Most 
prominently transaction cost economics (c.f. Williamson 1985) suggests that choosing 
alternative providers may incur switching costs, in particular if specific investments are 
needed that prevent clients from terminating existing relationships. In addition, the relational 
view (Dyer and Singh 1998) suggests that clients and providers may build up relation-
specific resources and capabilities (see also Svejenova et al. 2006); personal relationships that 
promote interpersonal attachments (Levinthal and Fichman 1988); and loyalty and trust 
(Gulati 1995; Chiles and McMackin 1996; Larson 1992; Das and Teng 1998) that favor 
longer-term relationships. In our study, we test the effect of generating asset and relation 
specificity on the likelihood of deal renewal. In addition, we account for a number of factors 
that have been neglected in previous research. In particular, given increasing client concerns 
about ‘hidden costs’ of offshoring (Dibbern et al. 2008; Stringfellow et al. 2008), we account 
for the importance for clients to maintain managerial control within offshore outsourcing
relationships. In particular, we examine how contracts and other control mechanisms may 
impact longevity of client provider relationships. We also consider the role of task knowledge 
intensity and provider characteristics such as provider size, experience and location of 
provider, on deal renewal. 
5Next, we consider in more detail recent trends and challenges of offshore outsourcing, 
both from the client and service provider perspective, using ORN data. Based on these 
findings, we develop two related theoretical perspectives to explain longevity of offshore 
outsourcing relationships: The first, considers how relation specific factors may impact the 
longevity of relationships. The second, considers how control mechanisms related to the 
problem of agency costs may impact the likelihood of deal renewal. In addition, we consider 
the role of task knowledge intensity on longevity of relationships. Finally we empirically test 
our hypotheses involving renewal or dissolution of outsourcing relationships. The discussion 
section considers the implications of our findings for the growing literature on strategic 
outsourcing in general (e.g. Holcomb and Hitt 2007; Quinn 1999; Henley 2006), and for 
strategies and governance mechanisms needed to manage the challenge of ‘hidden costs’ in 
offshore outsourcing, e.g. service quality, in particular (e.g. Aron and Singh 2005; Dibbern et 
al. 2008; Stringfellow et al. 2008).
Offshore outsourcing: Recent trends and challenges
In recent years, more and more Western multinational corporations (MNCs) have begun to 
source not only administrative and technical services from abroad, but also to use specialized 
external providers offshore to deliver services for domestic and global operations (Couto et 
al. 2008). Recent data from the Offshoring Research Network (ORN) supports this trend. The 
ORN is an international research initiative launched at Duke University, which involves 
partner universities in Europe and Asia. Since 2004, it has studied major offshoring drivers; 
risks; location choices; delivery model choices; performance indicators; and future plans, 
based on annual client and service provider surveys (see e.g. Lewin and Couto 2007; Couto et 
al. 2008; Heijmen et al. 2009). The ORN database includes 1,454 U.S. and European client 
6firms and 514 service providers from all over the world. We utilize ORN data throughout this 
study to discuss recent offshore outsourcing trends and challenges and to explore the drivers 
underlying the stability of client-vendor relationships as indicated by deal renewal.
According to ORN data, offshore outsourcing, using external suppliers, rather than 
captive offshoring, using wholly owned units, has become the dominant governance model in 
recent years; across business functions (see Figure 1). The range of reasons include the 
increasing availability of service providers offering not only standardized administrative 
services, but also more specific and knowledge-intensive product development and analytical 
services (see Figure 2 for the cumulative percentage of providers offering specific services 
over time). However, as business services are becoming more commoditized, more providers 
are able to offer services at low costs which decreases incentives for client firms to 
internalize the delivery of these services, and which also decreases costs of switching 
providers. Figure 3 displays the trend of perceived commoditization of services, from the 
perspective of service providers: the horizontal axis measures degree of commoditization 
today, the vertical axis measures predicted commoditization in the future. In addition, client 
firms have become increasingly experienced with offshoring tasks in general, and with 
offshore outsourcing in particular. Recent studies indicate that prior outsourcing experience 
has increased the likelihood of selecting third party outsourcing providers over a captive 
solution (e.g. Lewin et al. 2010). This is partly because companies recognize that managing 
outsourcing activities is not their core competence and that providers can provide the 
advantages of economies of scale and scope (see also Langlois and Robertson 1992). 
--------------------------------
INSERT FIGURE 1, 2, 3, 4 HERE
------------------------------------   
7Despite the increase in commoditization of services and the growing trend towards selecting 
third party providers, clients continue to report major managerial challenges in implementing 
offshore outsourcing projects. Figure 4 lists by level of importance major challenges 
perceived by clients. Among them, loss of service quality stands out as the most important 
risk. Other major risks include employee turnover offshore, operational efficiency, data 
security, and loss of managerial control. Most of these risks are related to the principal-agent 
problem, i.e. the challenge of, and the costs involved in, controlling and monitoring the 
performance of subsidiary units and external suppliers under conditions of asymmetric 
information (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In the context of offshore outsourcing, these 
managerial challenges have often been referred to as ‘hidden costs’ which may lessen or even 
diminish the very cost savings driving many outsourcing decisions (Aron and Singh 2005; 
Dibbern et al. 2008; Stringfellow et al. 2008). Interestingly, service providers similarly 
perceive achieving expected service quality as their major managerial challenge and as a 
major reason for termination of contracts (Couto et al. 2008). Because of the practical 
relevance of these challenges, we consider the role of control mechanisms as a potential key 
dimension in managing and sustaining vendor relationships.
Despite the importance of these risks ORN data suggests that client-vendor relations 
are not terminated very often. According to the ORN service provider survey, on average 70 
percent of all outsourcing deals are renewed at expiration (This finding is also supported by 
propriety data from TPI which tacks total contract value of every signed and terminated deal 
above $25M). In other words, termination of provider contracts happens less frequently than 
one would expect given that clients continue to report problems with quality of service, data 
security, and other issues, while at the same time offshore services become more 
commoditized and more providers enter the market which, in principle, reduces cost of 
contracting for services as well as simplifies and lowers switching costs.  
8Why Offshore Outsourcing Relationships Sustain
Previous research has examined a number of reasons why client-vendor relationships sustain. 
For example, transaction cost economics (c.f. Williamson 1985) emphasizes the role of task-
specific investments, and related switching and other transaction costs in preventing clients 
from terminating existing relationships (Williamson 1971; Barthélemy and Quélin 2006). 
Yet, the above mentioned trend towards greater standardization of services suggests that 
additional factors are likely to contribute to the longevity of client-vendor relationships. A 
number of scholars have argued that beside task properties the very relationship between 
client and provider itself may develop a certain ‘specificity’ promoting the development of 
mutual trust and collaborative capabilities driving stability (Dyer and Singh 1998; Gulati 
1995). We discuss in particular the role of ‘relation specificity’ in greater detail below. In 
addition, we have argued above that client concerns with service quality, managerial control 
and other issues may impact outsourcing decisions and performance. We therefore discuss 
the role of monitoring and control mechanisms in sustaining client-vendor relationships. 
Finally, we investigate to what extent the nature of tasks itself may impact longevity. In 
particular, previous studies indicate that knowledge intensity of tasks may impact outsourcing 
decisions and transaction costs (e.g. Mudambi 2008; Brusoni 2005), and, hence, also affect 
the likelihood of relationships to sustain. Our hypotheses are summarized in Figure 5.
--------------------------------
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE
------------------------------------   
Asset and Relation Specificity 
From an economic perspective, obstacles to switching transaction partners may arise from 
different types of costs: search costs involved in finding a new partner; contracting costs
9involved in negotiating a new contract (Dyer 1998); and costs involved in transferring 
specific assets (Barthélemy and Quélin 2006). As more providers offer a variety of services 
(see above), and as client firms have at the same time developed contracting capabilities 
facilitating outsourcing decisions (Argyres and Mayer 2007), client firms today can be 
expected to be less concerned with finding providers or with setting up contracts. However, 
selecting and contracting with a new provider is still a major effort of time and expense; in 
addition, ‘transferring specific assets’ to new providers, including process or product-specific 
knowledge, can be very costly in terms of time and managerial resources. 
Building on that idea, Barthélemy and Quélin (2006) distinguish two types of 
switching costs: core-related specificity and adapting human assets. Core-related specificity
refers to “the extent to which the resources that underlie an outsourced activity contribute to a 
firm’s competitive advantage”. In particular, if the underlying resources, e.g. particular 
process knowledge, are highly specific to a relationship, firms are reluctant to switch service 
providers partly because of creating joint equity in the relationship (Svejenova et al. 2006). 
Service providers play an important role here because they may gain and develop knowledge 
which is valuable to the client. Thereby, the client takes the risk of ‘losing’ process 
knowledge and of becoming dependent on the provider. However, the client may also benefit 
from the provider’s ability to perform client-specific tasks. While a client can be uncertain 
about knowledge protection, core-related specificity may therefore promote mutually 
beneficial long-term relationships. Adapting human assets “refers to the extent to which 
specific assets have been developed to deal with a particular vendor as opposed to the 
activity’s execution in-house” (ibid). This complex process relates to another dimension of 
specificity: the specificity of the relationship itself, independent from particular tasks (Dyer 
and Singh 1998; Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995).
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The latter in particular – which can be called ‘relation specificity’ as opposed to task-
related ‘asset specificity’ – has been subject of a number of studies on business relationships. 
For example, using an event-history analysis, Levinthal and Fichman (1988) find that auditor-
client relationships are rarely terminated, and that the likelihood of termination decreases the 
longer a particular relationship is sustained. One main reason for this is that clients and 
auditors see a value in sustaining a relationship once it reaches a certain point of stability. For 
example, over time business partners may develop joint routines, resources and capabilities 
and thereby leverage on the stability of their relationships (Dyer and Singh 1998; for a 
combined perspective c.f. Williamson 1999). Using structural equation modeling based on 
data from 157 organizations, Gainey and Klaas (2003) further find relational trust to mediate 
the reselection of vendors (see also Gulati 1995; Uzzi 1997; Beckman et al. 2004). Results 
suggest not only that mutual trust may develop over time and make partner reselection more 
likely, but that clients often seek to develop trustful long-term business relationships. 
One key mechanism that promotes asset and relation specificity and hence increases 
switching costs are client-specific investments that the provider undertakes to make in order 
to customize the delivery of the service, i.e. to develop specific capabilities and routines 
(Dyer and Singh 1998; Larson 1992), to generate trust and reciprocity (Granovetter 1985; 
Uzzi 1997; Gulati 1995), and to promote interdependencies (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999) that 
commit business partners to an existing relationship.  Therefore, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1: Client-specific investments by the provider are positively related to the 
likelihood of deal renewal.
Monitoring and Control Mechanisms
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While asset and relation specificity are important elements of deal renewal, we further 
propose that the client’s ability to manage the perceived problem of agency costs further 
promotes enduring outsourcing relationships. Agency costs are typically discussed for 
situations where ownership and control are separated. They include costs involved in 
overseeing and monitoring provider activities and measuring provider performance (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976). While this notion has been largely developed by (financial) economists 
(c.f. Fama and Jensen 1983), it is a major subject of discussion in the international business 
literature, involving the relationship between headquarters and subsidiaries (Roth and 
O'Donnell 1996). In such situations, agency costs arise because of conflicts of interest 
between subsidiary and HQ-based managers in the organization. 
Within offshore outsourcing relationships, agency costs may arise for two related 
reasons. Selecting the outsourcing solution for service delivery generally involves a trade-off 
between the benefits of a lower-cost external solution, and the perceived loss of managerial 
control over the process. Loss of managerial control matters when it is associated with loss of 
process knowledge and when outsourcing performance is not directly measurable. In 
addition, client firms and providers typically have different interests. While clients’ interest 
may be to secure the delivery of services at a high quality, while saving costs, the provider 
may want to fulfill its task as efficiently as possible and maximize gross margins. Aron and 
Singh (2005) conclude that tasks whose outcomes are not directly measurable should not be 
outsourced to third-party service providers. This, however, ignores the empirical reality that 
clients have been increasing scale and scope of tasks and processes being outsourced despite 
the risks involved (see above), and that clients – as well as providers – have over time 
developed and internalized organizational capabilities to manage the uncertainties of client-
provider relationships. 
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Prior research suggests that clients apply certain strategies to reduce risks related to 
agency costs (Eisenhardt 1989). Björkman et al. (2004), for example, point out that clients 
often attempt to align interests with providers to reduce the potential for opportunism, e.g. by 
creating incentives for longer-term relationships. Client-specific investments, as discussed 
above, are, in fact, one important means to create such incentives since they help generate 
client-specific resources and capabilities which cannot be easily applied to other clients. 
However, not every transaction or service delivery may require or benefit from client-specific 
investments. In those situations, in particular, clients rely on certain monitoring and control 
mechanisms to manage the perceived problem of conflicting interests and the limited 
measurability of performance. Next, we discuss contracting and client involvement as two 
major control mechanisms.  
From a client perspective, contracting can be an important element of safeguarding 
vendor relationships. Transaction cost and institutional economics suggest that effective 
market transactions depend, among other things, on proper contracts (Coase 1937; North 
1990). Contracting is a means to guarantee the fulfillment of the obligations of each party. 
Among other things, contracts may force transaction partners to make different service-
related aspects measurable. In turn, the effectiveness of contracts may depend on the ability 
of partners to measure the quality and quantity of services (Jensen and Meckling 1995). 
Aksin et al. (2008), for example, show that call center contracts can be based on call volume 
and capacity referring to different ways of quantifying service delivery and performance. 
Based on the principle of measurability, contracts can be more or less detailed. Basic 
contracts typically describe the services provided and their quantity, and location of litigation. 
More elaborate contracts specify number and experience of employees involved, gain 
sharing, cap on wage increases, client specific investments, and training of employees etc. 
Setting up such detailed contracts can be an important capability (Argyres and Mayer 2007; 
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Hansen 2007). Following the assumption that including more aspects in contracts may 
safeguard operations and make deviance from expectations less likely we hypothesize the 
following:
Hypothesis 2:  The number of items covered in the offshore outsourcing contract is positively 
related to the likelihood of deal renewal.
In addition to detailed contracts, clients may engage in monitoring service providers to secure 
service delivery and to reduce typical risks, such as deteriorating service quality (Lewin and 
Couto 2007). Within MNCs, monitoring can range from direct supervision by expatriates 
(Eisenhardt 1985) to indirect monitoring, e.g. through bureaucratic rules (O'Donnell 2000). In 
third-party offshoring, however, monitoring through expatriates and reporting is more 
difficult to implement than in captive models. Service providers are often not willing to let 
clients have much influence on operational issues of the service delivery. But even within 
firms, O’Donnell (2000) finds that possibilities for direct monitoring decrease as subsidiary 
autonomy increases. Therefore, conventional monitoring practices are expected to play a 
subordinate role in offshore outsourcing. Instead, we suggest that client involvement and 
frequent interaction, e.g. through boundary spanners, can be an effective ‘control strategy’. 
For example, involvement of clients in service operations may promote the sharing of tacit 
knowledge in a ‘controlled way’ which allows providers to build up client-specific expertise, 
but also gives the client the opportunity to ‘oversee’ this process to some extent.  
However, active involvement seems to be effective only if the client has sufficient 
knowledge about the outsourced process (Martinsons 1993). This was an important issue in 
the context of IT outsourcing in the 1990s. At that time, companies often lacked in-house 
knowledge about particular IT operations, so that they depended on external expertise. We 
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assume however that if the client interacts frequently with the provider and gets involved in 
service operations this also generates knowledge to evaluate performance. If performance can 
be evaluated by the client, control can be better exerted and clients are less likely to feel the 
need to terminate contracts. In a similar fashion, Takeishi (2001) found that client 
involvement is important as a moderator of outsourcing success. In their point of view, client 
involvement embraces problem-solving processes with the client, frequent face-to-face 
communication, as well as a sufficient level of knowledge transfer. The benefits of client 
participation in outsourcing operations are also observed by Malek (2000) who shows that the 
involvement of senior management has a positive effect on R&D outsourcing in the 
pharmaceutical industry. We therefore predict that client involvement may increase the 
likelihood of deals being renewed. We hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 3: The involvement of the client in service operations increases the likelihood of 
deal renewal.
Knowledge intensity of services
Above, we have primarily discussed organizational practices affecting deal renewal and the 
longevity of outsourcing relationships. We acknowledge, however, that in addition to client-
specific investments, contracting, and client involvement, some properties of the service itself 
may influence the likelihood of deal renewal. Previous research suggests that in particular the 
knowledge intensity of tasks may influence outsourcing decisions. Knowledge intensity 
refers to the degree to which the delivery of tasks requires specialized skills and tacit 
knowledge – related to particular products and/or the client. Typically, scholars categorize 
software and product development, including product design, engineering and R&D, as well 
as knowledge and analytical services as highly knowledge intensive (e.g. Mudambi 2008; 
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Lewin et al. 2009a; Kenney et al. 2009), whereas administrative services, including call 
center operations, finance and accounting, and HR, are considered to be more commoditized 
and less knowledge intensive (see also above). 
Because higher-skilled knowledge services are often client-specific and partially tacit 
by nature, many scholars have suggested that they are less likely to be outsourced in the first 
place (e.g. Mudambi 2008). However, recent ORN data suggests that for example knowledge 
process outsourcing (KPO) is a rapidly growing practice and that the number of KPO service 
providers has been increasing exponentially (Couto et al. 2008). In turn, more and more 
clients make use of external providers when sourcing knowledge services from abroad (see 
above). However, because of the high level of tacit knowledge involved in delivering these 
services, specifying tasks, qualifying the provider to perform these tasks, and managing 
exchanges between client and provider can be highly problematic (e.g. Brusoni 2005; 
Mudambi and Tallman 2010). In other words, the delivery of knowledge-intensive services 
may require both client- and product specific investments, involving the commitment of 
client resources to training. Also, performing knowledge-intensive services efficiently may 
take time and depend on learning curve effects. From a transaction cost economics (TCE) 
view, this suggests that both the client and the provider will engage in knowledge-intensive 
service agreements only if there are prospects of developing what Mudambi and Tallman 
(2010) call an “institutional alliance” involving complex governance structures and allowing 
for deal renewal to generate returns on investment. We can therefore hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4: Knowledge intensity of services is positively related to deal renewal.
However, whereas from a TCE perspective deal renewal will be more likely, an operational 
process perspective suggests otherwise. Many knowledge-intensive services, in particular 
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analytic services, software and product development, are performed on a temporary and 
sometimes one-off project basis (Hobday 2000). Unlike more routine-like business 
relationships, project-based relationships are likely to be discontinuous (Hadjikhani 1996).
Even if they provide future opportunities for collaboration, projects are typically followed by 
latent time periods (Starkey et al. 2000; Manning and Sydow Forthcoming). Therefore, 
although business partners in project-based relationships might have an interest in sustaining 
these relationships in order to exploit accumulated joint equity based learning and expertise, 
collaborative projects rarely follow each other on a regular basis. Sometimes, even successful 
project collaborations are never followed up on – maybe because the client initiates very 
different projects over time requiring different expertise and qualifications only available 
from specialized providers.  In addition, the interest of clients to protect intellectual property 
related to knowledge-intensive tasks may prevent more extensive knowledge transfer and 
hence make renewal less likely. Following these operational process arguments, we can 
formulate a competing hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: Knowledge intensity of services is negatively related to deal renewal.
Data and Methodology
We use data from the ORN service provider survey to test our hypotheses. The service 
provider survey annually collects a range of firm- and service-specific data through an online 
data entry system from service providers in the U.S., Western and Eastern Europe, India, 
China, Latin America and other regions. Data on the firm level include e.g. range of services 
provided, headquarter location, number of employees, types of clients served, risks perceived, 
and future plans. On the service level, the survey informs about features of services provided 
(e.g. degree of commoditization, complexity, degree of client-specific investment, client 
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involvement etc.), locations from which services are provided, and performance of service 
delivery (e.g. savings achieved, time to reach targeted service levels). Services include IT 
services, finance and accounting, HR, legal services, call centers, procurement, marketing 
and sales, knowledge and analytical services, and product development. Measures include 
numerical values (e.g. years of experience), percentages (e.g. savings), and 5-point Likert 
scales, in particular for more qualitative variables (e.g. perceived task features). Particularly 
interesting for our study are service-level data on deal renewal rates, client-specific 
investments needed, client involvement in operations, and task features. Importantly, most 
service providers in the survey offer a variety of services, but give specific responses about 
every particular service they offer. Unlike many surveys which collect data merely at the firm 
level, this survey allows us to use more fine-grained service-level information. Table 1 lists 
the variables used for our analysis along with respective survey questions. 
-----------------------------------
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
-----------------------------------
In total, 514 service providers have taken part in the survey since it was first launched in 
2007. Survey respondents are recruited through a number of channels, e.g. the International 
Association of Outsourcing Professionals (IAOP), LinkedIn.com, XING.com, and business 
promotion agencies in different countries. Survey respondents include all major international 
service providers, e.g. Wipro, Infosys, Accenture, as well as many small and mid-size, more 
or less specialized providers from across the world. Overall, 25% of providers are large (> 
10,000 employees), 32% are midsize (500-10,000 employees), and 43% are small (<500 
employees). Since the survey is taken online, some respondents reach the survey website 
through external links or email invitations, whereas others randomly open the website and 
register for the survey. Once registered and approved by the ORN survey team, respondents 
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are added to the database. Typically, however, not every respondent completes the survey 
right away. At regular intervals, registered users are reminded to complete the survey. For 
data analysis, all those survey responses are used that cover a sufficient number of questions. 
For this study, the questions listed in Table 1 were particularly important. 
For the analysis we use a two-sided truncated Tobit model. Tobit models are used to 
describe the relationship between a non-negative dependent variable and an independent 
variable (Greene 2003). Since our dependent variable – deal renewal (see below) – is a 
percentage number that cannot be negative and that cannot be more than 100 percent, we use 
the two-sided truncated Tobit model with a lower limit of 0 and an upper limit of 100.  
Similar to the Probit model, the Tobit model uses a latent variable y* assuming a constant 
relationship between the dependent and the independent variable. The latent variable is 
linearly depending on a vector β which is determining the relationship between the 
independent and the latent variable. For the regression, we were able to utilize 508 service-
specific observations, including 16% Administrative Services, 10% Call Centers, 21% IT, 
18% Product Development, 15% Software Development, 5% Analytical Services, 15% Other 
Services, with complete data for all dependent and independent variables, based on responses 
from 176 firms (13% large, 30% midsize, 57% small). Each firm provided detailed 
information on the delivery of different types of services (e.g. IT, Call Centers and Product 
Development). Large firms account for 19% of service data points, midsize firms for 31%,
small firms for 50%. We used Stata as a statistical software to run the regressions. Next, we 
discuss the operationalization of variables (see Table 2).
-----------------------------------
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
-----------------------------------
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Dependent Variable: Deal Renewal 
To identify drivers affecting the stability of offshore outsourcing relationships we use the rate 
of deal renewal as a dependent variable (see Tables 1, 2). Deal renewal captures the 
percentage of deals that are renewed rather than terminated at expiration. Deal renewal is 
service-specific. In other words, for each class of services provided, providers are asked to 
give the percentage of deals renewed at expiration (see Table 1). We also looked at 
alternative measures for relationship stability. For example, a number of studies focus on the 
longevity of the overall business relationship rather than particular types of transactions or 
service operations (e.g. Levinthal and Fichman 1988; Larson 1992; Gulati 1995).  However, 
one key problem with using longevity of client relationships as a dependent variable is that 
longevity will correlate with the age of the provider as well as size. As for the former, young 
providers are only starting to build up longer-term client relationships, whereas more 
established providers can build on a history of transactions with the same client. As for the 
latter, larger providers typically provide multiple services to the same client which makes it 
more difficult to investigate reasons for longevity or termination of relationships. Therefore, 
we decided to focus on explaining the renewal of particular deals, thereby controlling for 
both experience and size of the provider in the regression.
Client-specific Investments
We identified client-specific investments as the main independent variable measuring the 
degree to which specificity is generated in a client-provider relationship (H1, Figure 5). The 
ORN service provider survey contains data about the perceived importance of making client-
specific investments in infrastructure, software, and training at the service level, based on a 5-
point Likert Scale (see description on Table 1). Data indicates that there is a high correlation 
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between these variables, which allows to cluster them into a single variable. The variable 
included in the model is the sum of the measured importance of client-specific investments in 
the three categories. Unfortunately, we were not able to include data about the dollar value of 
client-specific investments made. Instead, we rely on a qualitative measure, from the 
perspective of service providers.
Contract Specification
To test the impact of client control on deal renewal, we identified contract specification as 
one of the independent variables (H2, Figure 5). Contract specification can be measured in 
different ways. Poppo and Zenger (2002) for example measure it using a Likert scale. In 
contrast, we identified, through expert interviews, the most important specifications that may 
appear in a contract. Specifications may range from quality attributes, quantification of 
services and costs, wage development and FTE specifications to gain sharing and arbitration 
location. We identified 12 attributes to be included in the survey. Respondents are asked to 
check whether or not a particular item is included in client contracts. We then measured the 
degree of contract specification as the number of items checked by a particular service 
provider. In order to make sure that the number of attributes regulated in the contract reflects 
the overall level of specification of contracts, attributes were selected in a mutually exclusive, 
collectively exhaustive manner. Unlike the other independent variables, data for contract 
specification is collected at the firm rather than the service level. Unfortunately, we were 
unable to use a service-specific measure for contract specification.
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Client Involvement
Beside contract specification, we identified client involvement in provider operations as a 
way to measure the degree of client control in outsourcing relationships (H3, Figure 5). The 
survey measures client involvement as the degree to which clients are involved in performing 
a particular task. In addition, the survey captures the degree of interdependency with 
processes in client organizations, as well as the frequency of interaction with clients. Due to 
the high correlation of these three Likert-scale variables, they were summed up and jointly 
considered in the model. The corresponding question was “for each service that your 
company provides, how would you rate the following characteristic to describe the work 
involved: (1) involvement of the client in performing the task; (2) interdependence with the 
client organization; (3) frequency of interaction with client”. 
Knowledge Intensity of Services
In addition to relation specificity and client control, we formulated two competing predictions 
involving the effect of knowledge intensity of services on the likelihood of deal renewal. For 
our analysis, we use a dummy differentiating services into highly knowledge-intensive 
services – software development, product design, engineering, R&D, and analytical services 
– and less knowledge-intensive services – e.g. finance & accounting, IT infrastructure, call 
centers, HR, marketing & sales. Since we lack information about the level of knowledge 
intensity of each particular service, we use this dummy as a proxy, thereby following a 
distinction made in several other studies (e.g. Lewin et al. 2009a; Manning et al. 2010; 
Kenney et al. 2009). However, we recognize that as a result of the fine-slicing and gradual 
disaggregation of value-adding processes in many firms today such distinctions may not 
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capture the changing level of knowledge intensity of tasks (Contractor et al. 2010). We 
discuss this as a limitation of our study later on. 
Control Variables: Size, Experience, and Location
We also include a number of control variables, in particular size, experience, and headquarter 
location of the provider. As discussed earlier, we have reason to believe that the size of the 
provider – measured here as the log of number of employees – may affect the rate of deal 
renewal. Similarly, experience – measured here as the number of years providing a particular 
service – is controlled for in the regression. Importantly, our emphasis is on service-specific 
experience rather than overall years in business. Previous research suggests that many service 
providers only recently started to provide particular services (see e.g. Couto et al. 2008; see 
also Figure 2). Independent of their total number of years in existence as a company, this 
makes them more or less experienced with delivering particular services. Finally, we control 
for the headquarter location of the provider. Prior research suggests that the location of 
service delivery may affect the perception of client risks, e.g. loss of intellectual property 
(e.g. Doh et al. 2009). In the regression, we use regional dummies to measure location 
effects. We included US, India, China, Other Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America. 
Western Europe served as a reference category, since providers from this region are closest to 
the average in terms of rate of deal renewal. Because of missing data, no providers from other 
regions, e.g. Africa, were included. 
Results
Table 3 depicts the results of the regression models. Six models are presented with rate of 
deal renewal as the dependent variable: Model 1 includes only the control variables (provider 
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size, experience, and location dummies). Models 2-5 include controls plus one of the 
independent variables (client-specific investments, contract specification, client involvement, 
knowledge-intensive services). Model 6 contains all control and independent variables. Table 
4 lists all variables and their pair-wise correlations, as well as average value, standard 
deviations, minimum and maximum. Significance levels for regressions and correlations are 
explained below the tables. 
Regressions support H1, H3 and H5, whereas H2 and H4 are rejected. First, our 
findings confirm that client-specific investments in software, infrastructure and training have 
a highly significant positive effect on rate of deal renewal (H1). In both Models 2 and 6, 
client-specific investments show a positive coefficient at the highest significance level. We 
have argued that client-specific investments promote the development of relation specificity 
between client and provider. Based on the results we can conclude that relation specificity is 
an important factor promoting durable client-vendor relationships. Second, our models 
confirm that client involvement in provider operations in combination with high frequency of 
client interaction and high degree of interdependence with the client organization are 
positively related to rate of deal renewal (H3). In both Models 4 and 6, our client involvement 
measure shows a positive coefficient, yet at a lower level of significance (p<0.1) than client-
specific investments (p<0.01). Since client involvement promotes the client’s ability to 
monitor and control the process of service delivery, we conclude that this form of control can 
promote stability of the relationship. Finally, our analysis shows that knowledge intensity of 
services – measured by a dummy combining software and product development, and 
knowledge/analytical services – has a highly significant negative effect on rate of deal 
renewal (H5). This is most likely due to the temporary project nature of many contracts 
related to knowledge-intensive services. In other words, the project character of knowledge-
intensive work makes immediate renewal of such outsourcing relationships less likely. 
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This, in turn, means that H4 which hypothesized that knowledge intensity of services 
should have a positive effect on deal renewal is rejected. We made this proposition as a 
counter hypothesis to H5 based on the argument that highly knowledge-intensive services 
may require particular client- and product-specific skill sets that can only be developed and 
utilized over time. Our findings indicate however that despite this potential requirement (and 
mutual investment) clients are less likely to renew such contracts on a regular basis.  
However, because of data limitations we do not know whether or not particular joint 
knowledge intensive projects are renewed at a later time, thereby bridging latent time periods.
We discuss this possibility as a limitation of this study and a potential future area of research.
In addition to H4, H2 is also rejected. We hypothesized that a high(er) degree of contract 
specification will increase the rate of deal renewal. However, our results suggest otherwise. 
In fact, Model 2 even shows that degree of contract specification is negatively related to deal 
renewal, not taking into account other explanatory variables. In the overall Model 6, this 
variable still shows a negative coefficient, yet becomes insignificant. Yet, this counter-
intuitive finding asks for a more detailed explanation. For example, it may suggest that clients 
(and providers) may opt for more market-type transactions by specifying contracts or for 
more open, less regulated, potentially longer-term relationships with mutual learning 
potential, supported by informal monitoring. Alternatively, this result may suggest that 
providers who are less restricted by contracts see this as an opportunity for hold-up and for 
building client dependency, facilitated by asymmetric information. We discuss these different 
interpretations in more detail later. 
In addition, our analysis shows some interesting effects of our control variables 
provider size, experience, and location. As for size, all models show a highly significant 
positive effect of log(number of employees) on rate of deal renewal with clients. This means 
that large providers are more likely than smaller providers to be able to sustain relationships 
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with clients at the service level. As we suggested earlier, large providers are more likely to 
have multiple service contracts with clients which may promote deal renewal for each 
particular service. Also, contract size may be larger making it costlier to switch. Although we 
cannot test this in the context of this study, large providers may be also more motivated to 
protect their market reputation by making sure that contracts get renewed, while being able to 
support deal renewal through client-specific investments and the building of relation 
specificity across and beyond particular services. As for experience, we do not find a 
significant effect in our model: number of years of providing a particular service does not 
explain any variation of deal renewal. This finding is somewhat surprising as it suggests that 
providers do not ‘learn’ over time how to better promote deal renewal with clients. Further 
research is needed to better understand why this might be the case. As for location, we get 
different effects which may stimulate future research. According to our models, being a 
provider from India or Latin America positively affects rate of deal renewal, whereas being a 
provider from China has a significant negative effect. As for India, the positive effect might 
relate to the overall capabilities and maturity level of Indian providers in attracting clients and 
developing longer-term relationships, as well as to size of contracts (e.g. according to TPI 
data executed value of contracts in India is far higher than in China). In addition, clients 
might perceive that China represents a fairly risky environment for developing longer-term 
service relationships.
Discussion
Offshore outsourcing of business services has become an established business practice in 
recent years, driven by the opportunity to fine-slice and disaggregate value-adding processes 
(Contractor et al. 2010), and to save costs and utilize specialized talent and expertise around 
the globe (Lewin et al. 2009b; Doh 2005; Bunyaratavej et al. Forthcoming). Over time, most 
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business services have become highly commoditized resulting in a growing and increasingly 
competitive service provider market (Couto et al. 2008). At the same time, client companies 
have become more experienced with offshoring in general and offshore outsourcing in 
particular, while they continue to be concerned with service quality and other performance 
issues. Interestingly, however, despite potentially decreasing switching costs, our findings 
suggest that the rate of deals being renewed at expiration is quite high, and that client 
relationships tend to endure over time. How can this phenomenon be explained? And what 
are the implications for understanding offshore outsourcing and outsourcing governance?
We focused on two interrelated factors potentially affecting the rate of deal renewal: 
relation specificity and client control. Based on data from the Offshoring Research Network 
(ORN), we measured the former by regressing deal renewal on the extent to which providers 
make client-specific investments in training, software and infrastructure; we measured the 
latter by regressing deal renewal on the level of contract specification and client involvement 
as independent variables. In addition, we hypothesized that knowledge intensity of services 
will have a significant effect on the rate of deal renewal. We find that client-specific 
investments and client involvement have a significant positive effect on deal renewal, 
whereas degree of contract specification and knowledge intensity of services have a negative 
effect. Findings suggest that if providers make investments into client-specific assets, while 
also allowing the client to get involved in operations, this may promote longer-term client 
relationships. This implies that both relation specificity and client control – in terms of the 
ability of clients to monitor processes and safeguard knowledge sharing – are important 
ingredients of stability in offshore outsourcing relationships. Interestingly, however, deal 
renewal is negatively affected by highly specific contracts. While contract specificity may be 
an important control mechanism, it does not promote longevity – on the contrary, it makes 
deal termination more likely. Finally, our analysis suggests that deal renewal is less likely if 
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services are highly knowledge-intensive, that is if they are related to software or product 
development, or knowledge/analytical services. 
These findings have important implications for our understanding of offshore 
outsourcing relationships in general (e.g. Holcomb and Hitt 2007; Quinn 1999; Henley 2006), 
and governance of these relationships in particular (e.g. Aron and Singh 2005; Dibbern et al. 
2008; Stringfellow et al. 2008). In general, our findings suggest that despite increasing 
commoditization of services, outsourcing deals are far from becoming spot market contracts. 
In fact, the rather high renewal rate and the role of relation specificity in sustaining client-
provider relationships suggest that clients and providers conceive of their relationships as 
strategically important, value-adding and potentially longer-term (see in general Holcomb 
and Hitt 2007). However, relation specificity does not seem to result from the value-adding 
nature of services themselves. For example, we have shown that deals involving highly 
knowledge-intensive services are less likely to be renewed. Rather, specificity seems to stem 
from search costs involved with finding new partners and specific investments needed to 
customize service delivery. In other words, whereas services themselves might become more 
commoditized, the delivery of these services can be rather customized in terms of interactions 
with clients; staff training; and software and infrastructure used to provide and orchestrate 
them with client systems. The strong positive effect of size of provider on rate of deal 
renewal further suggests that large providers might be benefitting from scale and scope of 
services they provide by generating synergies from making client-specific investments across 
types of services. Further research is needed to better understand these parallel trends – the 
effect of growing commoditization of services, and the semi-customization and resulting 
specificity of service delivery and client relationships. 
Moreover, whereas our study confirms the role of relation specificity in accounting 
for longer-term outsourcing relationships (see also Dyer and Singh 1998), our study also 
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points to the importance of safeguarding mechanisms as an important but often neglected 
variable that supports the exchange of specific knowledge while controlling for managerial 
risks inherently associated with engaging external partners in service delivery. Earlier in this 
paper, we mentioned the increasing awareness of scholars and practitioners of ‘hidden costs’ 
of offshoring in general and offshore outsourcing in particular (Dibbern et al. 2008; 
Stringfellow et al. 2008). Among other factors, clients often struggle with the potential loss of 
service quality, the loss of process knowledge, protection of intellectual property, and 
employee turnover and related additional training costs and other challenges (e.g. Lewin and 
Couto 2007; Heijmen et al. 2009). Our study indicates that providers may promote clients’ 
trust in the ability of providers to continuously deliver services reliably and efficiently by 
having clients participate in the processes of executing tasks and by engaging them in 
frequent interaction. This further highlights how the co-evolution of relation specificity and 
client control emerge from the underlying complementarity of client-specific investments 
needed by both clients and providers for realizing value from working together more closely, 
which, in turn, promotes specificity and makes switching to other partners less likely. More 
longitudinal studies of outsourcing relationships are needed to better understand the 
interrelation between growing relation specificity and safeguarding mechanisms.
Interestingly, however, other control mechanisms do not seem to have the same effect. 
Whereas client involvement in operations promotes deal renewal, high contract specification 
has the opposite effect. This surprising finding invites future research exploring in greater 
depth the role of contracts in client-provider relationships. Earlier we suggested that clients 
are potentially challenged by the lack of metrics for measuring service performance (Jensen 
and Meckling 1995), and, hence, the difficulty of setting up effective contracts (Argyes and 
Mayer 2007). Our findings might therefore indicate that in order to ensure satisfactory service 
delivery and to promote longer-term relationships, clients may prefer to get involved in 
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monitoring the process and in interacting with providers on a day-to-day basis instead of 
setting up detailed contracts which create unnecessary burdens for both the service providers 
and the clients. Another explanation of this effect could be that providers take advantage of 
underspecified contracts by meeting, for example, cost savings expectations while relaxing 
other criteria, such as skill level of employees, when they are not explicitly regulated in the 
contract. At the same time, underspecified contracts may give providers greater flexibility in 
managing contracts to exceed client expectations (Hansen 2007) and to help them benefit 
from deal renewal. Further research is needed to better understand mechanisms behind this 
interesting phenomenon.
Finally, our study suggests that durability of offshore outsourcing relationships is also 
affected by type of service delivered, size and location of the service provider. The delivery 
of knowledge-intensive services, including software and product development, is often 
organized in different ways than large-scale, more standardized administrative services. The 
project-based nature of much knowledge-intensive work suggests that service relationships 
involving this type of service are potentially temporary or bridge time periods of latency 
between projects (see e.g. Hadjikhani 1996; Manning and Sydow Forthcoming). Also, 
conversations with practitioners suggest that, in order to protect intellectual property, many 
clients refrain from sharing critical knowledge and instead prefer to outsource particular work 
packages on an adhoc basis. This seems in particular relevant for small providers who 
specialize in providing software and product development services. Future research needs to 
better address governance issues in this segment of the outsourcing space. In addition, more 
than has been done in this study, ongoing shifts and changes in the fine-slicing and gradual 
disaggregation of knowledge-intensive services need to be better understood. Not only do 
fine-slicing processes alter perceptions of ‘core’ vs. ‘non-core’ activities, but they also affect 
the ‘location’ of knowledge intensity within and across processes (Contractor et al. 2010). In 
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other words, how does the ongoing commoditization of services affect their degree of 
knowledge intensity, and how does that, in turn, affect the governance of outsourcing 
relationships? Future research needs to better address these questions.
Also, more insight is needed to understand how size and location matters in sustaining 
offshore outsourcing relationships. Findings indicate that large providers show significantly 
higher renewal rates. Their intimate knowledge of especially larger clients, and their ability to 
create synergy effects and relation specificity by engaging in multiple service relationships 
with these clients may promote deal renewal and longevity of relationships. At the same time, 
practitioners often point to the importance of reputation in particular for large providers who 
do everything in their power to satisfy clients and to ensure deal renewal. Finally, and maybe 
related to this, our findings indicate that providers from the very competitive Indian market 
show very high renewal rates, reflecting their client expertise and concern about reputation, 
whereas for example providers from China seem less able to renew deals, maybe because of 
lack of intellectual property protection and other legal uncertainties. Quite interestingly, 
providers from Latin America report fairly high deal renewal rates which may reflect their 
ability to customize services as has been shown in other studies (e.g. Manning et al. 2010). 
All these location-specific findings add to the debate on location factors in offshore 
outsourcing decisions, in particular the role of institutional contexts (e.g. Doh et al. 2009) and 
provider capabilities (e.g. Ethiraj et al. 2005) which may facilitate or constrain contracting, 
knowledge sharing, talent sourcing etc. 
Finally, this study has some empirical limitations which need to be addressed in future 
research. In particular, all data used in the regression has been collected from providers rather 
than clients. Because of reputation issues mentioned earlier, providers may for example show 
a tendency of exaggerating deal renewal rates. At the same time, we lack data on client 
satisfaction with outsourcing particular services. We do however know from the ORN client 
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survey that clients continue to perceive service quality, loss of managerial control and loss of 
process knowledge as key challenges in offshoring decisions. This has motivated us to look at 
potential mechanisms of client control. Yet, future research needs to better address the client 
perspective on outsourcing service delivery. Also, the provider sample used is not strictly 
representative of the total population. Although it does include providers of all sizes and 
services of different types, it also excludes particular sectors, such as drug clinical trials, for 
which data has not been made available yet. Also, despite increasing coverage of world 
regions, the provider database may over-represent providers from India, U.S. and Western 
Europe, while under-representing the provider space in e.g. Russia, Middle East and Latin 
America. As the ORN database continues to grow, more fine-grained studies on provider 
profiles, strategies and relationships with clients will be possible. 
In terms of explanatory factors, future studies may also go beyond the two major 
perspectives discussed in this paper – relation specificity and client control. For example, 
Levinthal and Fichman (1988) emphasize in their study the importance of personal ties in 
sustaining auditor-client relationships. Similarly, termination of offshore outsourcing deals 
might relate to key managers leaving the firm. In addition, a better understanding is needed of 
potential shifts in strategy on the client side affecting outsourcing relationships. Also, we are 
only just beginning to understand how offshore outsourcing relationships can be organized in 
different ways. Ethiraj et al. (2005) for example discuss the emergence of collaborative 
capabilities in the outsourcing field involving different arrangements of client participation, 
combinations of onsite and offshore teams, and different ways of using/hiring staff. These 
arrangements affect the degree of managerial control and may also help or hinder the 
continuation of contracts. The study presented here should therefore be a starting point of a 
stream of research examining drivers of stable offshore outsourcing relationships. 
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Figure and Tables
Fig. 1: Percent of Captive vs. Outsourced Service Projects Across Time
Fig. 2: Cumulative Percent of Providers Offering Particular Services
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Fig. 3: Degree of Commoditization of Business Services
Percentage of providers rating dimensions as high/very high
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Fig. 4: Perceived Client Risks of Offshoring and Outsourcing
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Fig. 5: Hypotheses
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Table 1: Survey Questions
Item Survey Question
Deal Renewal “For each class of services that your company provides, looking solely at 
the first contract with each client, please indicate: […] Percentage of 
deals that are renewed at expiration of the first contract.”
Client-specific Investment “For each class of services that your company provides, to what extent 
does your company have to make client-specific investments that cannot 
be used for other clients?” Investments in software, Investments in 
infrastructure, Investments in training (Likert : 1 very minor – 5 very 
extensive)
Contract Specification “Which of the following details are specified in your company’s 
contracts?”  (please check all that apply) (e.g. quality of service, cost 
savings for client, gain sharing, average wage increases, …)
Client Involvement “For each class of services that your company provides, how would you 
rate the following characteristics to describe the work involved? […] 
Involvement of client in tasks, frequency of client interaction, inter-
dependency with client organization.” (Likert 1 very low - 5 very high)
Knowledge-intensive 
Service
“Which of the following classes of services does your company 
provide?” (Respondents select from list, including IT, BPO, Call Centers, 
Software Development, Product Development, Analytical Services) 
Table 2: Construction of Variables
Variables Construction
Dependent
RENEWAL – Deal renewal Percentage of deals that are renewed at expiration [%] 
Independent
INVEST – Client-specific 
investment 
Importance of investments (in Infrastructure, Software and 
Training) measured on the 5 point Likert scale (collected at the 
service level) [Sum of three Likert-scale measures]
CONTSPEC – Contract 
Specification 
Number of issues (from a default list) covered in the contract 
(data collected at the firm level) [Number of items]
INVOLVE – Client 
Involvement 
Client involvement in task, client interaction, interdependency 
with client organization [Sum of three Likert-scale measures] 
KNOWINT – Knowledge-
intensive service
Service provided relates to product development, software 
development or knowledge/analytical services [Dummy]
Controls
SIZE – Size of Provider Number of employees at the provider [log(number)]
EXPERIENCE – Service 
Experience of Provider
Number of years a company is providing a particular service 
[Number of years] 
LOCATION – HQ Location 
of Provider
Country or region (aggregate of small sample countries) in which 
headquarter of service provider is located [Dummy]
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Table 3: Regression Model
Model: Two-sided truncated Tobit model (Dependent variable: Likelihood of Deal Renewal)
1 (Controls) 2 (H1) 3 (H2) 4 (H3) 5 (H4,5) 6 (Total)
H1: Client-specific 
investment 
(INVEST) 
1.288***
(0.004)
1.446***
(0.002)
H2: Contract 
Specification 
(CONTSPEC) 
-1.686**
(0.015)
-1.089
(0.117)
H3: Client 
involvement 
(INVOLVE)
1.072*
(0.036)
0.868*
(0.097)
H4, H5: Knowledge 
intensity of services 
(KNOWINT) 
-6.310**
(0.019)
-8.375***
(0.002)
Control:  Size of 
Provider (SIZE) 
1.770***
(0.001)
1.652***
(0.003)
2.278***
(0.000)
1.807***
(0.001)
1.557***
(0.005)
1.668***
(0.004)
Control: Experience
(EXPERIENCE)
-0.175
(0.342)
-0.121
(0.508)
-0.144
(0.433)
-0.069
(0.705)
-0.142
(0.439)
0.031
(0.863)
Control: USA 
(LOCATION)
2.553
(0.509)
2.547
(0.506)
3.638
(0.355)
1.894
(0.621)
2.991
(0.438)
3.934
(0.309)
Control: India 
(LOCATION)
9.059*
(0.068)
8.958*
(0.068)
8.358*
(0.095)
9.313*
(0.057)
9.748**
(0.049)
10.000**
(0.040)
Control: China 
(LOCATION)
-11.157*
(0.033)
-11.601**
(0.026)
-10.177*
(0.053)
-10.510**
(0.041)
-10.044*
(0.055)
-8.861*
(0.086)
Control: Other Asia 
(LOCATION) 
7.965
(0.233)
8.073
(0.220)
7.514
(0.262)
7.835
(0.232)
7.562
(0.256)
7.443
(0.252)
Control: East. Europe 
(LOCATION) 
-5.597
(0.324)
-6.576
(0.241)
-5.648
(0.320)
-5.112
(0.359)
-3.898
(0.493)
-3.872
(0.487)
Control: Lat. Amer. 
(LOCATION) 
10.589*
(0.076)
11.032*
(0.061)
11.158*
(0.062)
9.753*
(0.097)
10.280*
(0.083)
10.662*
(0.067)
Constant
61.731***
(4.370)
50.789***
(5.668)
66.537
(4.846)
48.589***
(7.052)
64.764***
(4.538)
45.946***
(7.848)
N 524 517 521 514 524 508
LR χ2 38.33*** 46.32*** 44.21*** 42.38*** 43.89*** 62.23***
Significance levels: *p<0.1      **p<0.05      ***p<0.01
1Table 4: Correlation Table
Variable Average Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum RENEWAL INVEST CONTSPEC INVOLVE KNOWINT
RENEWAL 71.368 25.520 0 100 1.000
INVEST 8.799 2.824 3 15 0.130***
(0.003) 1.000
CONTSPEC 5.311 2.024 1 12 0.015
(0.733)
0.010
(0.830) 1.000
INVOLVE 11.002 2.474 3 15 0.101*
(0.023)
0.208***
(0.000)
-0.066
(0.140) 1.000
KNOWINT 0.374 0.484 0 1 -0.137***
(0.002)
0.111**
(0.012)
-0.085*
(0.056)
0.115***
(0.010) 1.000
SIZE 6.579 2.577 1.099 11.374 0.188***
(0.000)
0.076*
(0.089)
0.387***
(0.000)
-0.009
(0.845)
-0.149***
(0.001)
EXPERIENCE 8.567 7.189 1 60 0.031
(0.482)
-0.038
(0.395)
0.100**
(0.024)
0.014
(0.750)
0.049
(0.274)
USA 0.409 0.492 0 1 0.038
(0.398)
-0.030
(0.498)
0.252***
(0.000)
-0.006
(0.887)
-0.031
(0.480)
INDIA 0.144 0.351 0 1 0.127***
(0.005)
0.035
(0.430)
-0.085*
(0.055)
-0.008
(0.852)
-0.015
(0.734)
CHINA 0.100 0.301 0 1 -0.138***
(0.001)
0.054
(0.225)
0.049
(0.303)
-0.028
(0.528)
0.053
(0.232)
OTHER ASIA 0.049 0.217 0 1 0.041
(0.361)
-0.061
(0.718)
-0.085*
(0.057)
0.031
(0.484)
-0.063
(0.156)
EAST. EUR. 0.073 0.260 0 1 -0.092**
(0.038)
0.041
(0.351)
-0.126***
(0.005)
-0.048
(0.283)
0.159***
(0.000)
LAT. AMER. 0.065 0.247 0 1 0.081*
(0.069)
-0.041
(0.360)
-0.021
(0.640)
0.092**
(0.038)
-0.055*
(0.214)
Significance levels: *p<0.1      **p<0.05      ***p<0.01
N = 508 (Variables included in Regression Model 6)
